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Executive Summary
Each of the fifty states oversees at least one public retirement system for employees. This
study examines which factors affect the funded ratio of these systems. The intent of this paper is
not to solve the problems facing public retirement systems, but to give decision makers and
policy leaders a better understanding of what affects the funding levels of these systems.
Understanding the various factors that affect the funded ratio will help decision makers
determine which changes should be made to public retirement systems.
The funded ratio is one of the main methods used to determine how well funded these
systems are and indicates an ability to pay accruing liabilities (Boston College Public Plans
Database). It is defined as actuarial assets divided by actuarial liabilities. Existing literature
suggests that investment returns and a consistent lack of employer contributions have driven
down the funded ratio of states' public retirement systems. This paper examines these factors, but
also looks at the effects of Social Security eligibility, cost of living adjustments, type of
retirement plan offered, payroll, number of members, and employee contributions.
To determine the effect of these variables on the funded ratio, I created a dataset of staterun public retirement systems from 2001 to 2009. This data was obtained from the Public Plans
Database, a product of the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College. A model was
created and a linear regression estimated the effects of the various factors. The linear regression
model found six significant explanatory variables: plan type, actuarial assets, annual required
contributions (ARC), payroll, the employee contribution rate, and employer contributions. All of
the explanatory variables were found to be significant at the 99% confidence interval with the
exception of employer contributions. Employer contributions were found to be significant at the
90% confidence interval.
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Based on the regression results, I recommend states pay toward the existing ARC. Since
this impacts the funded ratio, existing statutes prohibiting a certain contribution level or simple
failure to make payments, will probably increase the amount that states must pay in the future.
Reducing the ARC will lower the system’s actuarial liabilities relative to assets and potentially
make future ARC payments lower.
Actuarial assets also have a statistically significant impact on the funded ratio in my
analysis. Though it is outside the scope of this study to make recommendations regarding
specific retirement systems, my analysis indicates that increasing assets relative to liabilities will
raise the funded ratio. My results indicate that this could be done through increased employer
contributions, a reduction in payroll, and lowering the ARC.
Introduction
In 2012, the Pew Center on the States estimated that public retirement obligations in the
United States in 2010 were underfunded by $757 billion, when accounting for current and future
liabilities (Pew Center on the States 2012). In the fall of 2008, the financial markets experienced
a near collapse, and public retirement systems suffered from investment losses just like private
sector companies and individual portfolios. Coupled with changes by state governments in the
early 2000s that increased payments to retirees, and states’ failure to consistently make the
annual required contributions to retirement systems, a number of systems faced funding
challenges (Pew Center on the States 2007).
In many instances, states contribute to multiple retirement systems every year. State
public retirement systems consist not only of the traditional state employees’ retirement systems
(those people working in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches), but also teachers, fire,
police, and any other system run by the state. Individual retirement systems exhibit different
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characteristics across states. For example, the systems vary in the plan type offered to
employees, the number of members participating, and contributions made - both by the employee
and the employer.
Despite these differences, one of the main criteria used across all systems to judge
whether or not a retirement system is sufficiently funded, and has the ability to meet current and
future obligations, is through the calculation of the funded ratio (Munell et. al 2008). The funded
ratio is defined as actuarial assets divided by actuarial liabilities. Actuarial assets are a system's
asset value based on the assets' current market value and some unrealized gains and losses from
previous years. Actuarial liabilities are the present value of future benefits the system must pay
to retirees (Boston College Public Plans Database).
When looking at bordering states or even the same system across years, this ratio
fluctuates. This inconsistency prompted my research question: which factors affect the funded
ratio of states’ public retirement systems? I was interested in seeing if the seemingly more
obvious factors of plan type, investments, and employer contributions were the only factors
affecting the funded ratio, or if other variables, like the total number of members, cost of living
adjustments, employee contributions, and Social Security eligibility affected it as well.
This paper includes a problem statement, background of applicable information
pertaining to state-level public retirement systems, a review of a set of academic studies and
articles, and a research design explaining how the analysis will be conducted. A discussion of my
regression results, recommendations, limitations, and ideas for future areas of study complete the
contents of this paper.
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Problem Statement
Given the challenges facing public retirement systems in recent years, it is important to
examine which factors affect the funded ratio. I believe understanding the factors affecting this
ratio is helpful to decision makers. Legislators retain the authority to allocate money to these
systems and make statutory changes to how they operate. If legislators properly understand what
affects the funded ratio, then it might allow them to make more informed decisions in the future
regarding possible changes to these systems. This topic is of interest to decision-makers, publicsector employees, and citizens having to potentially bear the cost if sufficient revenue does not
exist to pay retirees. Shortfalls in the assets of these systems must be borne through higher taxes
paid by citizens or through reduced benefits for retirees (Eaton and Nofsinger 2008). In recent
years, court cases have become an issue for state governments wishing to adjust existing
retirement benefits. Participants in these systems argue that changing their benefits takes away an
established right. According to the Center for Retirement Research, in 2009, the most recent year
in my dataset, public retirement systems had over $3 trillion in liabilities and $2.6 trillion in
assets (Public Plans Database).
As part of this project, I analyze the relationship between the funded ratio and a series of
explanatory variables selected through a review of existing literature. Based on previous studies
and my own intuition, I hypothesize actuarial assets, employer and employee contributions, the
employee contribution rate, total number of members, payroll, Social Security eligibility, and the
percent of the annual required contribution paid by the employer will positively affect the funded
ratio. I hypothesize that the type of retirement system, actuarial liabilities, cost of living
adjustments tied to the Consumer Price Index, and annual required contributions will negatively
affect the funded ratio.
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Background and Relevant Facts
Types of Retirement Plans
Employees in the United States, both in the public and private sectors, generally
participate in one of two types of retirement plans: defined benefit and defined contribution. A
defined benefit plan guarantees participants a specified monthly payment during their retirement
years. This monthly payment amount is usually based on a number of factors, such as the
participant's years of service with the organization, salary during working years, and age. Often
the payment is calculated using a formula consisting of these factors (IRS). Because a specified
payment amount is guaranteed based on a set of pre-determined calculations, the employer bears
the investment risk in this plan. If investment returns are lower than expected, the employer must
make up the additional funds to pay retirees.
A defined contribution plan consists of contributions made by both the employee and the
employer to an employee's individual account. At the time of distribution, the amount of funds in
the account is subject to taxation. The value of the account will fluctuate over time due to market
performance and contributions. Unlike in a defined benefit plan, an employee participating in a
defined contribution plan does not receive a guaranteed amount of money during retirement –
placing the investment risk on the employee. A standard 401(k) plan is an example of this type of
plan (IRS).
No two state public pension systems exhibit the same characteristics in terms of the type
of plan they offer. The majority of state retirement systems still participate in the traditional
defined benefit plan, but some systems have adopted either defined contribution or hybrid plans
over the years. Hybrid plans incorporate elements of both defined benefit and defined
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contribution plans. Several state governments, including Alaska, now offer this type of plan to
public employees.
Investment of Pension Funds
Once contributions are made to a public retirement system, those contributions are
invested in various securities to generate income. In calculating the total value of retirement
benefits for members of a particular system, actuaries make assumptions about investment
performance. In data obtained from Boston College's Public Plans Database, for 104 state-level
public retirement systems, the range of projections on investment returns is between four and a
half to nine percent. On average, an eight percent returned is projected over the long term, a
higher expected rate than in the private sector (Coggburn and Kearny 2010). Except for the
Kentucky Employees Retirement System in 2008 and the Kentucky Teachers Retirement System
in 2007, which projected returns of four and a half percent, all other systems in all other years
projected at least a seven percent return. It is important to note that actuaries' investment
assumptions are discounted back to the present over the long term. Despite the annual fluctuation
in investment returns, which can include multiple years of negative returns, over the long-term
actuaries expect a positive investment performance.
While outside the scope of this project, a system's assets are invested in a variety of
securities, including stocks, bonds, international securities, real estate, and short-term
investments. Despite the positive long-term return projections, many systems recorded negative
investment returns over the years examined in this study (Boston College Public Plans
Database).
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Literature Review
Over the years, a number of studies have reviewed public retirement systems and the
issues they face. These studies tend to focus on why public retirement systems are underfunded,
particularly in regard to the type of plan offered to employees, investment returns, and the
contributions made by employers. Previous studies differ in regard to whether a defined benefit
plan is the right option for public employers and how much the type of plan offered impacts the
funding levels of retirement systems. Some of the literature also touches on the role that Social
Security eligibility might play in regard to systems' funding and employer contributions. Recent
articles from the Pew Center on the States, published after the start of the Great Recession,
discuss state governments' efforts in the wake of the financial crisis to fund ailing retirement
systems. These efforts include changes to cost of living adjustments (COLA) and modifications
to plan types; however, in multiple states these changes have been challenged by current and
former public employees participating in the retirement systems.
Governments and Defined Benefit Plans
All else equal, scholars assume that employees would prefer a job offering retirement
benefits to one that does not. Researchers have found that public employers offering defined
benefit pension plans retain more workers and experience less employee turnover (Almeida and
Boivie 2009). It appears that defined benefit plans are desirable to workers and an incentive for
them to work in public service, as opposed to seeking a perhaps higher paying job in the private
sector. Despite the most recent recession, opportunities for obtaining a job in the public sector
remain favorable (Franzel 2009). New, and thus a higher number of, employees means greater
future liabilities for state retirement systems.
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Defined Benefit Plans and the Funded Ratio
Lahey and Anenson (2007) believe the problems facing state public retirement systems
directly stem from the existence of defined benefit pension plans. They make this argument
because in a defined benefit plan, the state (employer) bears the cost of market fluctuation. If the
market performs well, then assets rise and states can contribute less state dollars to retirement
systems. In this scenario, the investment income helps to pay actuarial liabilities; however, if the
market performs poorly, as it did in the late 2000s, then the employer must pay a greater amount
of the accruing liabilities from their own funds. Over time, poor market performance contributes
to the amount that governments must pay into public retirement systems. Coupled with budget
shortfalls and other state expenditures, payments to retirement systems have sometimes fallen
behind.
Lahey and Anenson mention that the primary way to determine whether or not a
retirement system is funded is to calculate its funded ratio. Their study mentions how this ratio
fluctuates due to investment returns, and how this fluctuation impacts states' retirement
liabilities. According to Lahey and Anenson, drops in the funded ratio prove significant,
especially for state systems participating in defined benefit pension plans. A drop in this ratio
means more accrued liabilities relative to assets.
Public Retirement Systems and Employer Contributions
The funding efforts of public retirement systems are measured through both the funded
ratio and the system's consistency in making its annual required contribution (ARC) payments
(Munnell et. al 2008). According to this study, those systems making the ARC accrue sufficient
savings to pay unfunded and accruing liabilities. Systems that fail to make payments towards the
ARC will likely experience an increase in unfunded liabilities as any unpaid liabilities from the
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current year will roll into unfunded liabilities. When unfunded liabilities increase relative to
assets, the system’s funded ratio decreases. Like Munnell et. al, Truesdell (2011) also concluded
that state retirement systems with a lower funded ratio have a higher ARC.
While some states fail to make ARC payments for other fiscal reasons, Munnell et. al
(2008) found some states are constrained by statute in regard to how much they can contribute to
public retirement systems. For example, the authors found that Kansas's 2006 contribution of
around 63% of its ARC was slightly smaller than actuaries recommended, due to its statutory
constriction. For states not legally constrained in their contributions, Munnell et. al found that
larger systems were more likely to fail to make the recommended ARC payments.
Public Retirement Systems and Social Security
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that more than twenty-five percent
of state and local government workers do not pay into the Social Security System and are
ineligible to receive benefits based on their government earnings (Government Accountability
Office 2012). Koggburn and Kearny (2009) considered the impact of Social Security eligibility
on public retirement systems between 2006 and 2007. They hypothesized that states not offering
Social Security to employees would have more funded retirement systems due to the pressure to
provide public employees with more generous retirement benefits; however, in their analysis,
they did not find Social Security ineligibility to be statistically significant in relation to unfunded
liabilities.
A 2012 report by the GAO found that employees and employers in public systems
ineligible for Socials Security benefits make higher contributions to their states' retirement
systems (Government Accountability Office 2012). The report by the GAO, though, did not use
statistical analysis to reach this conclusion.
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Changes Before the Great Recession
In 2012, the Pew Charitable Trust estimated that as of 2010, states had unfunded pension
liabilities of approximately $757 billion. Changes made to these retirement systems in the early
2000s and market fluctuation throughout the decade impacted public retirement systems. In
2000, approximately half of the states considered themselves fully funded, with the ability to pay
future liabilities (Pew Center on the States 2007). At the start of the decade, the market was
performing strong and some state legislatures decided to make changes to public retirement
systems. These changes included reducing the age at which employees could start receiving
benefits and the multipliers used to calculate employees' monthly benefits in defined benefit
plans. These changes raised the systems' liabilities by increasing the amount of money
employees were eligible to receive in retirement. Despite adding to the liabilities of the systems,
a number of states still failed to contribute adequate funding amounts during this time (Lahey
and Anenson 2007).
While the market exhibited a strong performance between 1999 and 2000, by the time of
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the market had begun to sour and contribution shortfalls
in public retirement systems hurt asset growth (Pew Center on the States 2007). A 2007 report by
the Pew Center on the States suggested that pension levels would begin to rise again in 2008.
Instead, 2008 rocked the financial markets, the Great Recession began, and contributions to
retirement systems actually declined by five percent between 2008 and 2009 (Pew Center on the
States 2011).
Changes Since the Great Recession
For many years, public retirees have received increased payments from their former
employers to cover cost of living adjustments; however, since the most recent recession, several
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state governments’ attempts to change public retirees' cost of living adjustments (COLA) have
resulted in multiple court cases. Retirees in Colorado, Minnesota, and other states argue that
eliminating or reducing COLAs violates their constitutional rights by taking away an existing
benefit.
The courts' interpretations of changes to cost of living adjustments in these states have
been split. For example, the Colorado District Court ruled that retirees participating in the state's
Public Employees Retirement System (PERA) did not have a contractual right to the COLA that
existed when they first reached retirement; however, in October 2012, the Colorado Court of
Appeals reversed the ruling. The Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the district court
and instructed the district court to determine "if the impairment of the right" was considerable
and if the COLA reductions served any public purpose (Justus vs. State 2012, 2). This case
remains ongoing.
In June 2011, Minnesota District Judge Gregg Johnson said cost of living adjustments
are not part of a contractual obligation guaranteed by the Minnesota or Federal Constitutions. In
his opinion, Johnson said that the power to make changes to COLA resides with the Minnesota
State Legislature (Fehr 2011).
Research Design
This quantitative study examines which factors affect the funded ratio of states' public
retirement systems. The funded ratio is the state's actuarial assets divided by its actuarial
liabilities to current and future retirees. A ratio of one or greater indicates the system's full ability
to pay its current and future retirement obligations. In my dataset, the reported funded ratios
range from .191 (West Virginia Teachers’ Retirement System in 2001) to 1.48 (University of
California Retirement System in 2001).
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One hundred four state level public retirement systems serve as the units of analyses in
this study, with the funded ratio acting as the key dependent variable. A public retirement
system, in the context of this project, includes any retirement system made up of state-level
public employees and run by the state. Therefore, the funded ratios of public employees,
teachers, police, fire, and any other employee-specific system run by a state are included in the
analysis. The number of systems is not uniform across states; however, each of the fifty states
oversees at least one public retirement system for employees.
This study does not examine the funding ratios of local public pension plans, as they are
separate from the state systems. Additionally, retirement systems run by the District of Columbia
do not factor into this analysis, as the District is not by definition a state.
Data Collection
I obtained the data for this analysis from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston
College's Public Plans Database (PPD)1. The Center for Retirement Research houses retirement
data on state and local public retirement systems from all fifty states and the District of Columbia
between 2001 and 2010; however, as of February 2013 the 2010 data had not yet been reported.
The PPD breaks down the data by the state, plan name, and fiscal year. Information on systems
participating in hybrid and defined contribution plans was obtained from the appendix in “A
Role for Defined Contribution Plans in the Public Sector,” a 2011 publication by the Center for
Retirement Research. Each state and its pension plan(s) included in this study contain data for
each year between 2001 and 2009. Table 4 in the results section of this paper, provides
information about summary statistics and missing observations.

1

More information on the Public Plans Database at the Center for Retirement Research can be found here:
http://pubplans.bc.edu/pls/apex/f?p=1988:3:0.
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Variables
Initially, I thought about the funded ratio as a function of contributions, payment
obligations, and characteristics. Contribution variables can be defined as revenue sources.
Variables include payments into the system by employers and employees as well as annual
investment earnings. All else equal, an increase in contributions increases the amount of money
available to pay current and future obligations. Based on my intuition that more dollars into a
system increases its funding level, I hypothesize that these variables positively affect the funded
ratio.
Governing bodies of state retirement systems invest in a wide range of securities. For the
purposes of this project, only the actual income levels from investments factor into the analysis.
Income from specific securities and the amount of assets allocated to various types of securities
are not examined. Since existing literature discusses a decrease in investment performance since
the Great Recession, I believe that investment income will positively impact the funded ratio.
Based on my own intuition, I think that systems with higher funded ratios will have greater
investment income.
Table 1: Contribution Variables

Variable
Employee Contributions
Employee Contribution
Rate
Employer (State)
Contributions
Investment Income
Actuarial Assets

Definition
Total amount all
employees pay
Percentage of wages each
employee contributes
Total amount employer
annually pays
Amount of income from
investments
Actuarial determined
amount of assets

Source: Author's compilation and the Public Plans Database
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Measurement
Millions of
dollars
0-1
Millions of
dollars
Millions of
dollars
Millions of
dollars

Hypothesized
Relationship to Ratio
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive

Payment obligation variables influence a system's funding levels and size. Granting cost
of living increases or failing to meet the recommended ARC, all else equal, appear to raise a
system's liabilities. The ARC is included in this category, because it is the amount actuaries
suggest the employer pay into the system to cover current liabilities and existing unfunded
liabilities; however, this suggested amount is not always paid, and previous research suggests
this affects the funded ratio. Given Truesdell's (2011) finding that states not meeting the
suggested ARC payments have lower funded ratios then states paying the suggested amounts, I
hypothesize that not making the suggested ARC payments increases the funded ratio. Since
previous research concluded that this is a known factor affecting the funded ratio, it would be
improper to not include ARC in my model.
COLA also falls into in this category of variables because as states grant cost of living
increases to retirees, the pension systems incur greater liabilities. Some retirement systems grant
a COLA based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and others have different means of deciding
these changes. For example, the Tennessee State and Teachers Retirement System allocates an
automatic, annual COLA of up to three percent based on the CPI; however, other systems, such
the Texas Municipal Retirement System, offer retirees a certain percentage of the change to the
CPI, as approved by the state legislature. Still other systems, like the California Teachers
Retirement System, have a flat rate (in this case two percent) previously established. I believe a
COLA tied to the CPI will have a negative relationship to the funded ratio, since states appear to
have less flexibility in setting the actual cost of living increase granted to retirees. For example,
if the CPI consistently increases each year, then these systems would be obligated to grant a cost
of living increase to retirees to reflect this change.

15

Table 2: Payout Variables

Variable

Definition

Cost of Living Increase
(COLA)*

Annual cost of living
increase to retirees
Actuarial determined
amount of liabilities
What employers must
pay to cover current and
unfunded liabilities
Percentage of ARC paid
into by the employer

Actuarial Liabilities
Annual Required
Contribution (ARC)
Percent of ARC

Measurement
0= COLA not tied to
CPI
1= COLA tied to CPI

Hypothesized
Relationship to
Funded Ratio

Negative

Millions of dollars

Negative

Millions of dollars

Negative

0-1

Positive

Source: Author's compilation and the Public Plans Database
*COLA is a dummy variable

The third category of explanatory variables is system characteristic variables. System
characteristics include whether or not employees are eligible for Social Security collection based
on their government service, actuarial assets, number of members participating in the system,
and the type of plan offered.
I hypothesize that enabling employees to collect Social Security benefits, in addition to
state pension benefits, will positively impact the funded ratio. Since employees in these plans can
supplement their state pension income with Social Security, it would appear that employees in
systems not participating in the Social Security System would need to receive higher pension
benefits for consumption smoothing purposes. Using my own intuition, I believe that the number
of retirees in a system has a negative relationship to the funded ratio. All else equal, the greater
the total members in a system, the greater the amount of money that needs to be paid out in the
form of retirement benefits.
In regard to the type of retirement plan offered, previous studies indicate that when a
system experiences financial difficulty, it switches from a defined benefit plan to another type of
plan. Therefore, I believe that defined benefit systems will have a negative relationship to the
16

funded ratio. In order to determine the type of plan public retirement systems participate in, I
spoke with a researcher at Boston College. After speaking with him and reviewing the data in the
PPD, I decided to remove three systems from my analysis. These systems either combined
multiple plans or had name variations that made it difficult to determine the type of plan the
system participates under.
Table 3: Characteristic Variables

Variable
All Members
Payroll

Social Security*
Plan Type*

Description
Total number of people
participating in the system
Amount employer pays to
current employees
Participation in Federal
Social Security System
Type of system the state
operates under

Measurement

Hypothesized
Relationship to
Funded Ratio

Millions of members

Positive

Millions of dollars
0= Not eligible for
benefits
1= Eligible for benefits
0= Not Defined Benefit
1= Defined Benefit

Positive

Positive
Negative

Source: Author's compilation and the Public Plans Database
*Social Security and Plan Type are dummy variables

Statistical Models
After formatting my data, I use Stata statistical software to test my hypotheses. Since I
was interested in finding out the effect of each of my explanatory variables on the funded ratio, I
used a linear regression model. This model consisted of the key dependent variable, the funded
ratio, and a series of explanatory variables.
Since the funded ratio is calculated as actuarial assets over actuarial liabilities, it was
inappropriate to include both variables in my regression model. Each of these explanatory
variables is a linear function of the other, with a correlation of .98. Therefore, I chose to keep
only the actuarial assets in my model.
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The linear regression model I used is as follows:
Funded Ratio = β0 + β1*(Plan Type) + β2*(Actuarial Assets) + β3*(Payroll) +
β4*(ARC) + β5*(Percent of ARC) + β6*(Employee Contributions) + β7*(Employer
Contributions) + β8*(Investment Income) + β9*(Social Security) + β10*(COLA) +
β11*(All Members) + β12*(Employee Contribution Rate) + ε
Since my dataset spans ten years, I controlled for time effects in my model. In order to do this, I
created a dummy variable for each year between 2001 and 2009. When I ran the linear
regression, I included each year's dummy variable except 2001. Since I did not include 2001, it
serves as my base year. Additionally my linear regression model reports robust standard errors to
control for heteroscedasticity.
Analysis and Findings
This study analyzes the funded ratio of 104 state-level public retirement systems. A linear
regression model was utilized to determine the effect of a series of explanatory variables on the
funded ratio. The results of the analysis indicate plan type, actuarial assets, payroll, ARC, the
employee contribution rate, and employer contributions have a statistically significant effect on
the funded ratio.
Summary Statistics
The summary statistics in Table 4 are reported in millions and indicate a variation in the
make-up of states’ public retirement systems. Some state-run systems are relatively small, with
fewer members and assets compared to the larger systems. All retirement systems indicate the
presence of actuarial liabilities, but the exact amount of these liabilities varies across systems. Of
the retirement systems included in my analysis, 38.7% indicate that cost of living increases are
tied to the Consumer Price Index, either through automatic adjustments or legislative approval.
Employees participating in nearly 80% of the analyzed state retirement systems are eligible to
receive social security benefits in addition to state pension benefits.
18

Table 4: Summary Statistics
Observations
Variable
Funded Ratio
Actuarial Assets
(millions of dollars)
Actuarial Liabilities
(millions of dollars)
All Members
(in millions)
ARC
(millions of dollars)
COLA*
Employee Contributions
(millions of dollars)
Employer Contributions
(millions of dollars)
Investment Income
(millions of dollars)
Payroll (millions of dollars)
Percent of ARC
Plan Type*
Social Security*

Mean

917

0.847

Std.
Deviation
0.169

Min

Max

918

21.135

30.488

918

24.3

33.1

0.492

294

928

0.204

0.245

0.001

1.619

936
935

0.458
0.387

0.697
0.487

0
0

7.242
1

926

0.264

0.418

-0.000001

3.882

933

0.427

0.707

-0.08

7.242

850
917
935
936
936

-0.067
4.720
92.465
0.906
0.769

5.058
6.061
34.393
0.292
0.422

-56.918
0.033
0
0
0

35.683
45.1
485.7
1
1

0.191

1.477

0.648 244.964

Source: Author's compilation using STATA and data from the Public Plans Database
*COLA, Plan Type, and Social Security are dummy variables in my model

Linear Regression
As Table 5 indicates below, six of the explanatory variables in my model have a
statistically significant impact on the funded ratio. Five variables have significance at the .01
level and one variable has significance at the .1 level. Other explanatory variables that I
originally thought would prove statistically significant in my analysis did not. Due to the high
correlation between actuarial assets and actuarial liabilities, only actuarial assets were included
in my linear regression model.
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Table 5: Linear Regression Results

Funded Ratio
Plan Type
Actuarial Assets#
Payroll#
ARC#
Percent of ARC
Employee
Contribution#
Employer
Contribution#
Investment Income#
Social Security
COLA
All Members#
Employee
Contribution Rate
FY 2002
FY 2003
FY 2004
FY 2005
FY 2006
FY 2007
FY 2008
FY 2009

Coefficient
0.0809
0.0062
-0.0089
-0.1259
0.0003

Robust Std. Error
0.0265
0.0008
0.0033
0.0269
0.0002

t-statistic
p-value
3.05
***0.002
7.41 ***<0.0001
-2.73
***0.007
-4.68 ***<0.0001
1.44
0.150

-0.0097

0.0291

-0.33

0.739

-0.0339
0.0016
0.0232
0.0122
0.0039

0.0197
0.0011
0.0153
0.0094
0.0550

-1.72
1.44
1.52
1.31
0.07

*0.085
0.151
0.130
0.192
0.943

-1.0940
-0.0456
-0.0798
-0.0953
-0.1089
-0.1119
-0.0951
-0.1170
-0.1499

0.2335
0.0283
0.0274
0.0260
0.0257
0.0262
0.0264
0.0253
0.0258

-4.68
-1.63
-2.91
-3.67
-4.23
-4.27
-3.60
-4.62
-5.81

***<0.0001
0.104
***0.004
***<0.0001
***<0.0001
***<0.0001
***<0.0001
***<0.0001
***<0.0001

Source: Author’s compilation using output from STATA and data from the Public Plans Database
Significance: ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.1; n=744; R-squared=.4222
# Indicates that the coefficient is reported in millions

Since I accounted for time effects in my model, the substantive magnitude of the
significant variables is an illustration of what the impact would have looked like in my base year
of 2001. In my model, the time effects are statistically significant (p<.01) and have a negative
relationship to the funded ratio. The funded ratio experienced a downward trend between 2002
and 2009. Though still negative, the ratio went up slightly in 2007. Of particular interest is 2009,
when the funded ratio decreased nearly fifteen percent relative to the base year of 2001.
Plan type has a positive and statistically significant relationship to the funded ratio. All
else equal, participation in a defined benefit retirement plan increases the funded ratio of
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retirement systems .08. This runs counter-intuitive to my initial hypothesis that offering a
defined benefit plan would negatively impact the funded ratio.
A positive and statistically significant relationship exists between the funded ratio and a
system’s actuarial assets. This relationship exists at the .01 level. For example, a $1 million
increase in actuarial assets would increase the funded ratio by .006. This result is not surprising
given that the funded ratio is actuarial assets divided by actuarial liabilities. States with higher
assets relative to liabilities would appear to be more able to pay accruing liabilities.
The annual required contributions (ARC) has a negative and statistically significant
relationship with the funded ratio (p<.01). Systems with a larger ARC have lower funded ratios.
As an illustration, a $1 million increase in ARC would decrease the funded ratio by .126. This
result supports my original hypothesis and existing literature. Given that ARC includes both
employer contributions necessary for a current fiscal year, as well as existing unfunded
liabilities, it makes sense that having a larger ARC would negatively impact funding levels.
Employer contributions have a negative and statistically significant relationship to the
funded ratio (p<.1). For every $1 million increase in employer contributions, the funded ratio
decreases by .0339. This finding goes against my initial hypothesis which was that increased
contributions would increase the funded ratio. Although my regression model does not tell me
why this relationship exists, one possible explanation is that systems increase their contributions
as new employees join the system. Bringing more people into the system affects the amount of
benefits that need to be paid out in the future, all else equal. This relationship could also exist
because if an employer is required to contribute more money per current employee, the employer
might be less able to pay down the ARC. If the system cannot reduce ARC, liabilities will
continue to exist.
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The employee contribution rate has a negative and statistically significant relationship to
the funded ratio (p<.01). In my base year of 2001, a one percent increase in the rate of wages that
employees contribute to public retirement systems decreases the funded ratio by .01. This impact
could result from having more employee contributions paid into the system that will eventually
need be paid out in the form of benefits.
Last, a system’s payroll and the funded ratio have a negative and statistically significant
relationship (p<.01). As systems’ payrolls increase, the funded ratio decreases. For example, a $1
million increase in payroll decreases the funded ratio by .008; however, a $10 million increase in
payroll would decrease the funded ratio by .08. This result was the opposite of my hypothesis.
Based on my own intuition, I reasoned that if payroll was higher, it would indicate the retirement
system has a larger contribution base. After reviewing my results, though, it seems that this
relationship could exist because more employees on the payroll means more people eventually
collecting benefits from the retirement system.
Some of the variables that I expected to be statistically significant, and was personally
most interested in, did not affect the funded ratio in the way I thought they would. In the wake
of the Great Recession, states began making changes to cost of living adjustments for
participants in their retirement systems. Given that nearly forty percent of my data tie these
increases to changes in the CPI, I thought this variable would have a significant relationship to
the funded ratio. Also, investment income was insignificant, going against my initial hypothesis.
Existing literature from the Pew Center on the States and other scholarly articles discuss the
downturn in the stock market following the financial crisis. The literature mentions that this
income reduction spurred decision-makers to make tweaks to retirement systems to increase
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funding. Therefore, it was surprising to me to find its lack of any statistical significance in my
model.
Additionally, I originally hypothesized that Social Security eligibility would have an
impact on the funded ratio. Existing literature suggests that employees in public retirement
systems not participating in the Social Security System receive higher benefits from these
systems during retirement. Therefore, I hypothesized that systems that participate in Social
Security would have a higher funded ratio. My analysis, though, did not show this relationship to
be significant.
Limitations
As previously discussed, public retirement systems differ in their individual
characteristics. A limitation of the PPD is that it does not contain all unobserved factors or all of
the underlying assumptions used in each system’s calculations. Since actuarial assets and
liabilities include assumptions about current and future obligations, having the calculations used
by each system’s actuaries would be helpful in creating an equalizing comparison of these
variables across systems.
Additionally, the Public Plans Database reports data from 2001 until 2010, though as of
February 2013, the 2010 data had yet to be included in the database. Ten years of analyzed data
from 104 public retirement systems increased the internal validity of this study and my results
are consistent; however, it is important to mention that the years analyzed in this study contain
data from the 2008 financial crisis. During this time, the markets dramatically fluctuated and
investment income plummeted. For example, relative to my base year of 2001, the funded ratio
in my linear regression model decreased by roughly fifteen percent in 2009. A recession like the
one that began in the fall of 2008 does not occur on a regular basis. Due to this occurrence, the
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results obtained from this analysis could differ for another time period. Since the financial crisis
had such a large impact on the US economy, I suspect this could be the case.
As previously mentioned, this study only focused on state level public retirement
systems. Given this fact, it would be inappropriate to generalize the results of this study to local
governments’ retirement systems, as these systems exhibit different characteristics from the
larger state systems.
Conclusions and Recommendations
According to existing literature, the funded ratio is one of the primary determinants of
whether or not a public retirement system has sufficient funding levels to pay current and future
liabilities (Munnell et. al 2008). Although a number of the variables I thought would hold
statistical significance in my model did not, I am still able to offer recommendations based on
my results.
First, I recommend decision-makers pay attention to the annual required contributions,
since in my analysis ARC had a negative and statistically significant impact on the funded ratio.
In other words, states with higher funded ratios have a lower ARC. Some public retirement
systems in my dataset have billions of dollars in existing ARC. I understand that states often
cannot afford to pay all of their underfunded liabilities in one fiscal year; however, the more a
state pays towards the ARC, the more funded their retirement systems will be. If a state has a
statutory limit on how much funding can be contributed to the state’s retirement systems each
year, I recommend that legislators and legislative staff review these laws. Even if a state is
adequately funded now, failing to make future payments towards ARC will raise the amount
required to cover liabilities and decrease actuarial assets. Laws preventing the suggested
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contributions from being made, even if the funds are available, might prove disastrous for a
system.
Second, raising a system’s assets relative to liabilities is important, as my results show
that actuarial assets have a positive effect on the funded ratio. Based on my results, methods such
as decreasing payroll or reducing ARC would raise assets relative to liabilities. I recommend
decision-makers study what specific changes need to be made to their state's retirement systems
to make this happen.
Research has shown that the opportunity for employment in the public sector remains
promising and that employees prefer jobs with benefits to those without them. In order to ensure
that public retirement systems continue to function as they should in the future, decision-makers
should examine the factors that affect the funded ratio of all of the state retirement systems in
their states. Using that knowledge, they will have a better understanding about which changes
need to be made to the systems and any laws that place constraints on the system.
Areas for Future Study
The analysis of the funded ratio of states’ public retirement systems provides a number of
opportunities for future research. As previously mentioned two limitations of this study were the
absences of unobserved factors and missing underlying assumptions. Using a method that could
take all of the different actuarial calculations and standardize them across systems would be very
useful to decision makers in the public sector.
Additionally, this study does not examine how the age at retirement or the duration over
which retirement benefits received affects a system’s funding. This data was not available on the
Public Plans Database, but researching this topic could prove useful when considering changes to
public retirement systems, their funding levels, and the benefits paid out.
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While public retirement systems certainly face many challenges, no existing literature
suggests that these systems will be disappearing in the near future. Continuing to conduct
research, not only on the funded ratio and factors affecting it, but also retirement systems
generally, will give decision makers and those in relevant leadership positions, further
recommendations on which to base their decisions. For any possible changes to public
employees’ retirement, decision makers should have as much data on the subject as they can and
a firm understanding of factors affecting the system.
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